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Abstrat
Reent development in quantum omputation and quantum infor-
mation theory allows to extend the sope of game theory for the quan-
tum world. The paper presents the history and basi ideas of quantum
game theory. Desription of Gien paradoxes in this new formalism is
disussed.
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1 Motivation
Attention to the very physial aspets of information haraterizes the reent
researh in quantum omputation, quantum ryptography and quantum om-
muniation. In most of the analysed ases quantum desription of the system
provides advantages over the lassial situation. The agships of quantum
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information are: famous Shor's polynomial time quantum algorithm for fa-
toring [1℄, Simon's quantum algorithm to identify the period of a funtion
hosen by an orale (more eient than any deterministi or probabilisti
algorithm) [2℄ and the quantum protools for key distribution, devised by
Wiener, Bennett and Brassard, and Ekert (qualitatively more seure against
eavesdropping than any lassial ryptographi system) [3, 4℄.
Game theory, the study of (rational) deision making in onit situation,
seems to ask for a quantum version. Games against nature, originally studied
by Milnor [6℄, inlude those for whih nature is quantum mehanial. Many
of quantum information problems have game-theoreti ounterparts. Finally,
von Neumann is one of the founders of both modern game theory [7℄ and
quantum theory. Classial strategies an be pure or mixed: why annot they
be entangled or interfere with eah other? Can quantum strategies be more
suessful than lassial ones? Are they of any pratial value?
2 Quantum Games
Any quantum system whih an be manipulated by two or more parties,
and where some utility of the moves an be reasonably dened, may be
oneived as a quantum game [8℄-[10℄. For example, a two-player quantum
game Γ = (H, ρ, PA, PB) is ompletely speied by the underlying Hilbert
spae H of the physial system, the initial state ρ ∈ S(H), where S(H)
is the assoiated state spae and ρ = ρA ⊗ ρB desribes the players, say
Alie (A) and Bob (B), initial strategies ρA and ρB. The pay-o (utility)
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funtions PA and PB speify the pay-o for eah player. Quantum tatis SA
and SB are linear (quantum) operations, that is, a ompletely positive trae-
preserving map mapping the state spae on itself. Employing a tatis, that
is performing the appropriate linear map, desribes a hange of the players
strategy. The quantum game's denition may also inlude ertain additional
rules, suh as the order of the implementation of the respetive quantum
strategies. We also exlude the alteration of the pay-o during the game.
The generalization for the N players ase is obvious. Shematially we have:
ρ
(SA,SB)
7−→ σ ⇒ (PA, PB).
3 Quantum Market Games
It is tempting to hek if quantum game theory may be suitable for desrip-
tion of market transations. A quantum game like desription of market
phenomena in terms of supply and demand urves was proposed in Ref.
[11℄-[13℄. In this approah quantum strategies are vetors in some Hilbert
spae and an be interpreted as superpositions of trading deisions. For an
eonomist (or trader) they form the potential "quantum board". Strategies
and not the apparatus nor the installation for atual playing are at the very
ore of the theory. If neessary the atual subjet of investigation may on-
sist of single traders, teams of traders or even the whole market. Due to the
possible eonomis ontext the quantum strategies reveal a lot of interest-
ing properties. Supply strategies of market objets are Fourier transforms of
their respetive demand states [13℄.
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Of ourse, sophistiated equipment built aording to quantum rules may
be neessary for generating or learing quantum market but we must not
exlude the possibility that human onsiousness (brain) performs that task
equally well. Even more, a sort of quantum playing board may be the natural
theater of "onit games" played by our onsiousness. The agents (market
players) strategies are desribed in terms state vetors |ψ〉 belonging to some
Hilbert spae H [10, 12℄. The probability densities of revealing the agents,
say Alie and Bob, intentions are desribed in terms of random variables p
and q:
|〈q|ψ〉A|
2
A〈ψ|ψ〉A
|〈p|ψ〉B|
2
B〈ψ|ψ〉B
dqdp , (1)
where 〈q|ψ〉A is the probability amplitude of oering the prie q by Alie
who wants to buy and the demand omponent of her state is given by |ψ〉A ∈
HA. Bob's amplitude 〈p|ψ〉B is interpreted in an analogous way (opposite
position). A short look at error theory (seond moments of a random variable
desribe errors), Markowitz's portfolio theory and L. Bahelier's theory of
options (the random variable q2 + p2 measures joint risk for a stok buying-
selling transation) suggest the following denition of the risk inlination
operator (a quantum observable):
H(Pk,Qk) :=
(Pk − pk0)
2
2m
+
mω2(Qk − qk0)
2
2
, (2)
where pk0 :=
k〈ψ|Pk |ψ〉k
k〈ψ|ψ〉k
, qk0 :=
k〈ψ|Qk|ψ〉k
k〈ψ|ψ〉k
, ω := 2pi
θ
. θ denotes the hara-
teristi time of transation [12℄ whih is, roughly speaking, an average time
spread between two opposite moves of a player (e. g. buying and selling the
same asset). The parameter m > 0 measures the risk asymmetry between
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buying and selling positions.
Analogies with quantum harmoni osillator allow for the following har-
aterization of quantum market games. The onstant hE desribes the min-
imal inlination of the player to risk. It is equal to the produt of the lowest
eigenvalue of H(Pk,Qk) and 2θ. 2θ is in fat the minimal interval during
whih it makes sense to measure the prot [11℄.
Exept the ground state all the strategies H(Pk,Qk)|ψ〉 = const|ψ〉 are
giens that is goods that do not obey the law of demand and supply, see
bellow. It should be noted here that in a general ase the operators Qk do
not ommute beause traders observe moves of other players and often at
aordingly. One big bid an inuene the market at least in a limited time
spread. Therefore it is natural to apply the formalism of nonommutative
quantum mehanis where one onsiders
[xk, xl] = iΘkl := iΘ ǫkl. (3)
The analysis of harmoni osillator in more then one dimensions imply that
the parameter Θ modies the onstant ℏE →
√
ℏ2E +Θ
2
and, aordingly,
the eigenvalues of H(Pk,Qk). This has the natural interpretation that moves
performed by other players an diminish or inrease one's inlination to tak-
ing risk.
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4 Market as a measuring apparatus
When a game allows a great number of players in then it is useful to onsider
it as a two-players game: the trader |ψ〉k whom we are observing against the
Rest of the World (RW). The onrete algorithm A that is used for learing
the market may allow for an eetive strategy of RW (for a suiently large
number of players the single player strategy should not inuene the form of
the RW strategy). If one onsiders the RW strategy it make sense to delare
its simultaneous demand and supply states beause for one player RW is a
buyer and for another it is a seller.
To desribe suh situations it is onvenient to use the Wigner formalism.
The pseudo-probability W (p, q)dpdq on the phase spae {(p, q)} known as
the Wigner funtion is given by
W (p, q) := h−1E
∫ ∞
−∞
eiℏ
−1
E
px
〈q + x
2
|ψ〉〈ψ|q − x
2
〉
〈ψ|ψ〉
dx
= h−2E
∫ ∞
−∞
eiℏ
−1
E
qx
〈p+ x
2
|ψ〉〈ψ|p− x
2
〉
〈ψ|ψ〉
dx,
where the positive onstant hE = 2πℏE is the dimensionless eonomi oun-
terpart of the Plank onstant. Reall that this measure is not positive def-
inite exept for very speial ases. In a general ase the pseudo-probability
density of RW is a ountable linear ombination of appropriate Wigner fun-
tions, ρ(p, q) =
∑
n wnWn(p, q), wn ≥ 0,
∑
n wn = 1. The diagrams of the
integrals of the RW pseudo-probabilities
Fd(ln c) :=
∫ ln c
−∞
ρ(p = const., q)dq (4)
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(RW bids selling at exp (−p))
and
Fs(ln c) :=
∫ ln 1
c
−∞
ρ(p, q = const.)dp (5)
( RW bids buying at exp q ) against the argument ln c may be interpreted
as the dominant supply and demand urves in Cournot (Frenh) onvention,
respetively [13℄. Note, that due to the lak of positive deniteness of ρ, Fd
and Fs may not be monotoni funtions. Textbooks on eonomis give exam-
ples of suh departures from the low of supply and demand (Gien paradox).
Fashion business and work supply are the soure of everyday examples of
suh assets.
5 Gien paradoxes
Note that the asymmetri rater-like hollow in (Figure 1) has the minimum
bellow zero, the fat whih qualitatively distinguishes the Wigner funtion
from the supply and demand distributions for models formulated in the realm
of the lassial probability theory in whih the measure of the probability has
to be nonnegative.
The intersetion of the surfae of the diagram with the surfae given by
p=constant represents the onditional probability density whih is the mea-
sure of the probability for the withdrawal prie of the player in the situations
when this prie is onstant during the at of selling. The withdrawal prie is
dened as the maximal (minimal) prie the player is going to pay (obtain)
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Figure 1: Exemplary plot of a Wigner funtion .
for the asset in question [14, 15, 13℄.
The ross setions for the negative values of the Wigner funtion are
harateristi for the situation of a gien strategy. The suitable integrals
for these urves represent fully rational situations for whih the demand (or
supply) ease to be a monotonous funtion. The example of suh a reation
of the player (it might be the rest of the world) is illustrated in Figure 2.
We observe here the lak of the property of the monotoniity for the de-
mand (or supply) urves (Gien paradox). In this ontext it is worthy to
raise the question whether the legendary aptain Gien, after observing a
market anomaly whih is ontraditory to the law of demand, has reorded
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Figure 2: Non-monotonous onditional demand: the integral urve for the
intersetion of the surfae from Figure 1 with the plain p = 0.4[ℏE
σ
]).
the surprising (although having logial explanation) demand that dereases
after the fall of the prie, or simply notied the destrutive interferene whih
had been the eet of a areful demand transformation harateristi for a
intelligent (hene ating rationally) but poor onsumer [16℄. The authors
inline towards the seond answer. It has the advantage of being apable of
falsiation whih is a onsequene of the preision qualitative preditions
for this phenomenon made by the quantum theory.
Therefore it seems important to look after the onditions of the market
under whih the strategies desribed by normal distributions do not lead to
the maximization of value of the intensity of the gain
1
[14℄. They might
explain the irumstanes in whih we met the Gien paradoxes.
1
see also E. W. Piotrowski's leture in urrent issue
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6 Summary and outlook
All this tempt us into formulating the quantum anthropi priniple of the fol-
lowing form. At earlier ivilization stages markets are governed by lassial
laws (as lassial logi prevailed in reasoning) but the inomparable eay
of quantum algorithms in multiplying prots will result in ontinuous hange
in human attitude towards quantum information proessing. The growing
signiane of quantum phenomena in modern tehnologies and their in-
uene on eonomis will result in quantum behaviour prevailing over the
lassial one. Therefore we envisage markets leared by quantum algorithms
(omputers), quantum autions providing agents with new means [15℄ and
quantum games being important tools in soial sienes, eonomis and bi-
ology [15℄-[21℄.
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